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This paper presents a description of Peru’s experience with
pandemic H1N1 influenza 2009. It is based on data from four
main surveillance systems: a) ongoing sentinel surveillance
of influenza-like illness cases with virological surveillance of
influenza and other respiratory viruses; b) sentinel surveillance
of severe acute respiratory infections and associated deaths; c)
surveillance of acute respiratory infections in children under the
age of five years and pneumonia in all age groups; and d) case and
cluster surveillance. On 9 May 2009, the first confirmed case of
pandemic H1N1 influenza in Peru was diagnosed in a Peruvian
citizen returning from New York with a respiratory illness. By July,
community transmission of influenza had been identified and until
27 September 2009, a total of 8,381 cases were confirmed. The
incidence rate per 10,000 persons was 4.4 (in the 0–9 year-olds)
and 4.1 (in the 10–19 year-olds). During epidemiological weeks
(EW)* 26 to 37, a total of 143 fatal cases were notified (a case
fatality of 1.71%, based on confirmed cases). The maximum peak
in the number of cases was reached in EW 30 with 37 deaths.
Currently, the impact of the pandemic in the Peruvian population
has not been too severe, and fortunately, healthcare centres have
not been overwhelmed. However, the future of this pandemic
is uncertain and despite the fact that our country has not been
seriously affected, we should be prepared for upcoming pandemic
waves.
Introduction
Peru is a South American country that is divided by the Andes
Mountains into three distinct natural regions (coastal desert,
highlands and jungle region) all extending the entire length of the
country. The coastal desert has limited rainfall (<20 cm per year)
with temperatures ranging between 15 and 30°C, and Lima, the
main and capital city, is located in the central part of this region.
The highlands that include cities located over 2,000 m above sea
level experience high levels of rainfall and temperatures ranging
between -2 and 15°C. Finally, in the jungle region rainfall exceeds
200 cm per year, and cities are located close to sea level with
temperature ranging from 18 to 32°C [1].
Since 1998, the Ministry of Health (MoH) of Peru has conducted
virological surveillance of influenza and other respiratory viruses,

and in 1999 surveillance of acute respiratory infections (ARI)
and pneumonia cases and associated deaths was implemented.
In 2006, the MoH established a sentinel surveillance system of
influenza-like illness (ILI) cases in all the three regions of the
country, in order to strengthen the National Surveillance Network
[2]. Through these systems, influenza circulation in Peru has
been detected throughout the year in coastal and jungle regions,
and seasonal circulation during winter time has been identified
in the highland region [3]. As a response of the World Health
Organisation’s (WHO) global pandemic alert, the MoH established
two additional surveillance systems: a case and cluster surveillance,
and surveillance for severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) and
SARI deaths.
On 9 May 2009, the first confirmed case of pandemic H1N1
influenza in Peru was diagnosed in a Peruvian citizen returning
from New York with a respiratory illness. Since then, the influenza
A(H1N1)v virus has spread rapidly throughout the country [4]. In
this context of preparation and response, this paper presents a
description of Peru’s experience with the H1N1 influenza pandemic
using data from the different surveillance systems in Peru.
Methods
The pandemic was described using data from four different
surveillance systems, which are summarised below. All four systems
report their data to the MoH. Case and cluster investigation was
temporarily carried out at the beginning of the epidemic.
Sentinel surveillance of influenza-like illness cases and
virological surveillance
Sentinel surveillance has been implemented in 50 health
centres in the country. Nasal or pharyngeal swabs were processed
at the Instituto Nacional de Salud (National Institute of Health,
INS) and the Naval Medical Research Center Detachment (NMRCD)
as previously described [3].
Case and cluster investigation
On 9 May 2009, after the WHO issued a global pandemic alert, a
surveillance system base on the case definition for pandemic H1N1
influenza was established by the MoH to define the procedures of
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detection, notification, investigation, follow-up and epidemiological
control of the H1N1 influenza in Peru [5,6]. A suspected case
was defined as any person with a sudden onset of fever (>38ºC)
and at least one of the following symptoms: cough or sore throat
within seven days of symptoms onset, in an area where confirmed
pandemic H1N1 influenza cases were reported or epidemiologically
linked to a close contact of a confirmed case. A confirmed case
was defined as any person with a positive result in the RT-PCR for
influenza A(H1N1)v virus. This system was stopped on 7 July with
the change to the mitigation phase.

Figure 1
Incidence of confirmed cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza,
by age group, Peru, 9 May-27 September 2009
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Surveillance for severe acute respiratory infections and
associated deaths
In July 2009, when community transmission of influenza was
identified, the MoH of Peru intensified surveillance efforts to
reinforce the sentinel surveillance of SARI [7]. SARI was defined
as any patient, with sudden fever >38ºC, together with cough or
sore throat and respiratory distress who needed medical care in a
hospital. Hospitalisation was defined as a patient spending at least
one night in a hospital or healthcare center. An online platform with
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Figure 2
Confirmed pandemic H1N1 influenza cases by onset of symptoms, Peru, 6 May-25 September 2009 (n=7,886)
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information of hospitalisation, comorbidities, outcomes, treatment
and other variables was established.
Acute respiratory infections, pneumonia and pneumonia deaths
surveillance
This system was optimised to follow up the spread of the
pandemic. ARI included all children under the age of five years,
while pneumonia cases and deaths were reported for all age groups.
Laboratory analysis
From nasal and/or oropharyngeal swabs, RT-PCR assays for the
detection of influenza A(H1N1)v virus were performed at the INS
and NMRCD as described by United States Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention [8]. At NMRCD in Lima, the specimens
were stored at -70ºC, and later inoculated for virus isolation and
identification [3] . An online official system (NETLAB-INS) was
established to access the results.

Figure 3

Results
Sentinel surveillance of influenza-like illness cases and
virological surveillance
We have previously reported the results of the sentinel
surveillance system in Peru from June 2006 to May 2008 [3].
Until 27 September, approximately 1,122 cases of pandemic
H1N1 influenza (13.4% of the confirmed cases) were identified
by this system. During the pandemic, the implementation of this
surveillance system allowed us to identify the first outbreak of
community transmission (18 May) with 11 confirmed cases in one
of the surveillance sites (Huanuco province) located in the highland
region of Peru.

Cases of severe acute respiratory infections, Peru,
EW22-EW37, 2009 (n=1,458)
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Control measures
When the active surveillance system was in place, case clusters
were identified by sampling symptomatic cases. Control measures
included the use of respiratory masks, increased hygiene (hand
washing) and administration of antiviral drugs (oseltamivir) to all
suspected and confirmed cases and their contacts during this
containment phase [4]. Following the WHO pandemic alert, travel
restrictions to Mexico were put in place on 30 April and measures
were taken to increase awareness of travellers of the new influenza
virus. Furthermore, active surveillance of febrile patients was
established in all airports, and a telephone hotline was established
to receive reports from the population on respiratory disease
and house identification of cases and contacts [4]. During the
subsequent mitigation phase, antiviral treatment was established
on 21 July and it was focused on the high-risk group (pregnant
women, cases under five years or over 60 years of age, or patients
with SARI or a risk comorbidity) [4].
The clinical-epidemiological forms of the cases were entered into
a database (NMRCD) or directly into an online platform on a website
of the Dirección General de Epidemiología (General Directorate of
Epidemiology, DGE).
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Figure 4
Case fatality rate per 100 cases by age group among patients
infected during the influenza pandemic, Peru 2009, 9 May19 September 2009 (n=143)
10
9

Case fatality rates [%]

8

7.63

Comorbidities and/or risk conditions detected in pandemic
H1N1 influenza cases with fatal outcome, Peru, 9 May-19
September 2009 (n=143*)
Comorbidity and/or risk condition (N=143)

n (%)

No comorbidity or risk condition

35 (24.5)

Comorbidity and/or risk condition

108 (75.5)

Metabolic

36 (25.2)

Cardiovascular

30 (21.0)

Respiratory

16 (11.2)

Neurological

14 (9.8)

Renal

13 (9.1)

Genetic

13 (9.1)

Other

10 (7.0)

4

Pregnancy and puerperium

6 (4.2)

3

Rheumatologic

6 (4.2)

Infectious

5 (3.5)

Digestive

4 (2.8)

Cancer

3 (2.1)

7.21
7
6
5
4.17

2.21
2
1
0

1.34

0.95
0.39
0-9

10 - 19

20 - 29

30 - 39

40 - 49

Age group [years]

50 - 59

60 +

* Multiple answers were possible

w w w. e u ro s u rve i ll an c e . o rg

3

Case and cluster investigation
Description of cases
Until 27 September 2009, a total of 8,381 cases of pandemic
H1N1 influenza have been confirmed, including 143 deaths. A
total of 4,263 confirmed cases (52%) were males. The subjects’
age ranged from ≤1 year to 80 years, with a median age of 19
years. Seventy-five percent of the cases were under 30 years-old
and only 3.15% were older than 60 years. ILI cases were notified
in all departments (administrative regions) of Peru, but Lima and
Callao together notified almost 40% of the cases.

Further, the percentage of positive samples increased from 10%
(EW23) to 70% (EW 25) and then started to decrease.
While the first epidemic peak occurred in Lima and Callao,
secondary peaks in the epidemic curve correspond to the epidemic
wave in the rest of Peru. The aggregated epidemic curve is
multimodal due to the sum of local epidemics at different spatial
locations where the novel influenza virus arrived at different times.
Description of clusters
The onset of symptoms of the first case was on 9 May 2009.
Following the index case, our surveillance system detected many
isolated imported cases that generated clusters of different size.
We detected and investigated six clusters associated with persons
returning from countries with or without demonstrated transmission
at the time. These countries included the Dominican Republic,
Mexico, Argentina and the US. Two of these clusters led to
community transmission in Peru. These clusters will be described
in depth elsewhere.

The risk of infection was greater in those younger than 20 years,
probably associated with sustained transmission within schools.
The incidence rates per 10,000 persons were 4.4 and 4.1 among
the 0-9 year-olds and the 10-19 year-olds, respectively (Figure
1). During the containment phase, the large number of suspected
cases that were detected (close to 400 per day) led to a delay in
the generation of laboratory results by INS and NMRCD. When the
containment phase ceased on 7 July, laboratory testing was focused
on SARI patients.

Surveillance for severe acute respiratory infections and
associated deaths surveillance
After the switch of the surveillance strategy from the containment
to the mitigation phase (7 July) as described above, the epidemic
trend was monitored through the detection of SARI cases. At the
time of writing this report, the trend of SARI cases for the whole

After 13 June (epidemiological week EW 23), an increase in the
daily number of ILI cases was identified with a peak on 22 June
(EW 25), as shown in Figure 2. This was followed by a consistent
decrease in the number of cases especially in Lima and Callao.

Figure 5
Cases of pneumonia among 5-59 year-old patients from Lima and Callao, 2009 (n=1,798)
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of Peru is slowly decreasing. In Peru, the peak was reached during
EW 28, followed by a decrease in SARI cases (Figure 3). In the
northern regions of the country, the peak was reached during EW
34, and in the southern regions a bimodal curve was observed with
two peaks at EWs 28 and 34 (data not shown).
SARI deaths
During EWs 26-37, a total of 143 deaths associated with SARI
were notified in 14 out of the 24 departments comprising Peru,
a case fatality percentage of 1.63%, based on confirmed cases.
Almost half of the deaths were recorded in the city of Lima and
the port of Callao. The maximum peak was reached at EW 30 with
37 deaths. After that, the number of fatalities decreased to two
cases in EW 37.
The median age of deaths was 39 years (range: 0-85 years) and
54% were women. The fatality rate was greater (7.63%) in persons
over the age of 59 years, whereas the rate in the younger age groups
(under 19 years of age) was lower than 1 (Figure 4).
In 32 of the deaths (24%), there were no recorded underlying
conditions. Six of the deaths (4.5%) were in pregnant women
or women in puerperium; six deaths were in cases with Down
syndrome; 23 in cases with obesity; nine in cases with diabetes
mellitus type 2 (three of them associated with obesity) (Table).
Acute respiratory infections, pneumonia and pneumonia
fatalities surveillance
The epidemic curve of pneumonia cases among 5-59 year-olds
in Lima and Callao increased in EW 26, reached the peak in EW
28 when schools were temporarily closed for three weeks. Following
this measure, the number of cases decreased as shown in Figure 5.
Control measures
Between 24 April and 4 July 2009, no cases were identified
in nearly 500,000 screened travellers, and hence the screening
system at airports was deemed ineffective and was suspended. The
first imported cases in travellers were identified who reported to the
telephone hotline centre implemented by the MoH.
Discussion
Surveillance of pandemic H1N1 influenza in Peru provided
valuable information about the behaviour of the pandemic in a
developing southern hemisphere country. Lessons can be learned
regarding the public health impact, prevention and control, impact
on health services, and effective surveillance.
Public health impact of the pandemic
Lima, the largest city with a population of eight million, has the
main international airport and was the first city in Peru affected by
the new influenza virus. In addition, all laboratory testing for the
country is centralised in this city. These factors could explain the
fact that almost 30% of the initial confirmed cases of pandemic
H1N1 influenza were located in Lima.
Until September 2009, Peru identified over 8,000 confirmed
cases, but this is only the tip of the iceberg. The pattern of
dissemination of this pandemic in Peru is associated with people’
mobility and population density, and more populated areas tend to
be affected earlier than smaller populations. Access to laboratory
resources across Peru is not uniform and could have affected this
transmission pattern. Moreover, distant and geographically isolated

locations may have not reported cases before the appearance
of severe cases who require mechanical ventilation in hospital
settings.
We observed that while a great number of people under the age
of 24 years were infected, this group had a lower probability of dying
from influenza. The lower frequency of pandemic H1N1 influenza
cases among those over 59 years of age supports the hypothesis that
people who were exposed to influenza A(H1N1) during childhood
before the 1957 have a certain extent of immunological protection
to the influenza A(H1N1)v virus [9]. Such a consistent pattern has
been reported in other regions including Mexico, the US, Europe,
Australia and New Zealand [10-11]. When infected, however, these
older patients had a high risk of fatality, in our country as reported
in other regions [12].
Cases of pandemic H1N1 influenza in Peru presented
predominantly mild and self-limiting illness, and although fever
and cough were the most common clinical manifestations,
many subclinical or asymptomatic cases should have circulated
in the country. The majority deaths related to pandemic H1N1
influenza (75.5%) had a reported underlying medical condition.
In fact, almost half of the deaths had conditions classified as
high risk in other countries [13]. The fact that 25% of the cases
did not have high risk conditions suggest that additional factors
such as immunological status or access to healthcare could have
contributed to the fatal outcome.
Our case definitions were very specific, but allowed us to develop
interventions and to sample suspected cases to help us identify
clusters and follow virus dissemination patterns throughout the
country.
Control measures and limitations of the study
Initial control measures established by the MoH of Peru included
travel restrictions and quarantine of suspected travellers following
WHO recommendations [14]. However, these actions were not
effective and did not significantly delay the spread of the virus
into other nations including Peru. Also, many travellers could have
enter the country during the incubation period, as detected in other
countries [15]. The telephone hotline was found to be useful in
identifying case clusters of suspected and confirmed cases and
following the dissemination of the virus throughout the country
[16]. House identification of cases and contacts and follow-up
procedures involved a great deal of human resources. As a result,
those activities were discontinued.
We believe that the epidemiological surveillance system
recommended by WHO, i.e. early case detection and investigation,
comprehensive assessment and pandemic monitoring [17], was
essential for the development of adequate control measures. At
the beginning of the pandemic, it is possible that our surveillance
systems failed to detect many cases, especially those with mild
disease. Many patients may not have visited a health centre or may
not have had access to laboratory services. ARI surveillance was
not as helpful as we expected, due to the limitations in detecting
cases among outpatients. The SARI surveillance system, however,
was useful because it allowed us to monitor the pandemic trends
in all age groups and among the more severe cases. It also allowed
us to evaluate the impact of the pandemic.
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Conclusion
It is well known that previous pandemics have presented a
second or third wave of morbidity and mortality. These multiple wave
profiles could be associated with spatial, seasonal, hemispheric
(north, south, tropics) or climatic (humidity, temperature) factors
[18,19]. Currently, the impact of the pandemic in the Peruvian
population has not been severe, and fortunately healthcare centres
have not been overwhelmed. However, the future of this pandemic
is uncertain and despite the fact that our country has not been
seriously affected, we should be prepared for upcoming pandemic
waves.
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